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Daily Closing Inside Spreads and Trading Volumes Around 
Earnings Announcements 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the determinants of inside spreads and their 
behaviour around corporate earning announcement dates, for a sample 
of UK firms over the period 1986-94.  The paper finds that closing 
daily inside spreads are affected by order processing costs (proxied by 
trading volumes), inventory control costs (trading volumes and return 
variability) and asymmetric information (unusually high trading volumes).  
Inside spreads start to narrow 15 days before an earnings 
announcement, and narrow further by the end of the announcement day.  
We also identify a puzzling phenomenon.  There is only a ‘sluggish’ 
recovery of spreads after the announcement:  inside spreads continue to 
remain at relatively narrow levels, and take up to 90 days to recover to 
their pre-announcement width. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Earnings announcements, spreads 
JEL codes:  M4, G1 
 4
I  Introduction 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the movement in inside spreads around corporate 
earning announcements for a sample of UK firms over the period 1986-94.  The primary motivation 
for the study lies in the arguments put forward in the main market microstructure theories of the 
quoted spread, to examine the implications they have for empirical testing of the inside spread.  The 
inside spread or the “touch” represents the lowest ask and the highest bid prices quoted by 
competing dealers at a point in time. Previous empirical work [Yohn (1998), Krinsky and Lee 
(1996), Lee, Mucklow, Ready (1993), Venkatesh and Chiang (1986)] on the movements in 
spreads around earnings announcements has focused on quoted spreads rather than inside spreads. 
 
In examining transactions on the London Stock Exchange, Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) 
draw a distinction between the quoted spread, the inside spread and the effective spread. The 
quoted spread is the difference between the bid and ask prices that a market maker will quote 
specifying the prices at which he is willing to trade, and the quoted spread may differ between 
competing market makers. Within the group of competing market makers, the lowest ask and 
highest bid price, possibly quoted by different market makers, represents the inside spread (or the 
touch as it is called on the London Stock Exchange). Finally individual traders may negotiate 
transactions prices with market makers that are better than the inside spread, and these transactions 
prices are the effective spread. The market microstructure theories typically explain the 
determinants of the quoted spread, but the dataset used in this paper is based on inside spreads, 
and in section II we examine the implications of the determinants of the quoted spread for the inside 
spread.  
 
The two principal theories of the quoted bid-ask spread are represented by ‘asymmetric 
information’ and ‘inventory control’ models.  The asymmetric information models argue that the 
bid-ask spread compensates market makers for adverse selection risk, the risk of trading with an 
investor who has superior information.  The emphasis of the inventory control models is on the costs 
of holding inventory.  One of these is the risk that the market maker finds himself holding non-
optimal inventory levels and is unable to adjust them by trading1.  Both adverse selection and 
inventory control risks are related to trading volumes, but in opposite directions.  If investors obtain 
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private information, they are likely to trade on that information, so that if market makers notice 
unusually high volumes of trade they will increase their spreads to compensate them for the 
perceived adverse selection risk.  Conversely, if trading volumes are generally low, market makers 
will find it difficult to adjust their inventory levels and will increase their spreads to compensate.   
 
These arguments suggest that the level of asymmetric information in the market and the risk of 
holding non-optimal inventory levels can both be proxied by some measures of trading volume. This 
is the approach taken by many studies in this area (see Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) and Stoll 
(1989), for example).  However, realised volumes may not completely reflect the extent of adverse 
selection risk caused by information asymmetry, or the risk of holding non-optimal stock levels 
caused by market illiquidity.  This is particularly the case in the period around earnings 
announcements. 
 
Since earnings announcements convey new information to the stock market, an impending 
announcement has the potential to induce information asymmetry by making private information 
acquisition attractive to potential traders2.  Although market-makers will be aware of the high level 
of information asymmetry present in the market, it is likely that the asymmetry will not be entirely 
reflected in increased trades, for reasons such as legal prohibitions on trading or general uncertainty.  
The spread will therefore be affected by an increase in perceived adverse selection risk that is not 
reflected by an observable increase in volumes. 
 
Turning to inventory control, the risk of holding non-optimal inventory levels is related to the depth 
of the market, that is the extent to which large trades can be undertaken at will, without incurring 
large transactions costs (including opposing price movements).  Although this is related to the 
volume of trades that are actually undertaken, the two are not identical, as market depth depends 
on the ‘latent’ demand and supply of the stock.  As shown in Lee et al (1993), market depth 
narrows just before earnings announcements, increasing the extent of unobservable inventory 
control risk.  In this case, the spread will again be affected by an increase in risk that is not reflected 
by an observable decrease in volumes. 
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It is likely therefore, that the trading volume proxies commonly used in the literature to analyse these 
determinants of the spread will not perform as well during announcement periods as at other times.  
The aim of this paper is to test whether the fact that an announcement is made carries incremental 
information in explaining the spread, over and above the standard trading volume proxies (also 
controlling for other relevant variables).   
 
We begin by examining the data to identify the patterns in inside spreads around earnings 
announcement dates, allowing our choice of event period to be driven by the patterns observed in 
the data.  We then expand the simple univariate approach to control for interactions of the spread 
with other market variables used in the literature, such as the trading volumes discussed above, to 
investigate whether these variables explain movements in the spread around announcement dates.  
 
In common with other studies, we find that important determinants of spreads are trading volumes 
and return variability (see footnote 1).  As predicted by the inventory control model, volumes are 
negatively related to spreads, while return variability is positively associated with spreads.  We also 
find that unusually high trading volumes, proxying asymmetric, are significantly positively related to 
the size of the spread, as predicted by the adverse selection models. 
 
As expected, inside spreads fall at the end of an announcement day, and volumes and return 
variability are higher on that day.  However, the fall in inside spreads appears to begin about three 
weeks before the announcement. This is clearly at odds with the idea that adverse selection risk and 
inventory control risk should cause spreads to widen before an announcement, and is not consistent 
with studies based on US data, such as Lee et al (1993) and Yohn (1998).  Although an earnings 
announcement does appear to affect the spread over and above the effect of the changes in the 
other variables at that time, the effect is to reduce it, rather than increase it, as would be suggested 
by the arguments outlined above.  A second puzzling phenomenon is that after the release of 
earnings information, inside spreads not only fall, but remain at the new lower level for up to 90 
days after the announcement date. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section II reviews the previous literature and 
section III describes the data.  The methodology is outlined in section IV, while section V presents 
the results.  Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
 
II  Previous Literature 
II(1)  Models of the Bid-Ask Spread 
There are two main theories of the quoted bid-ask spread, ‘asymmetric information’ models and 
‘inventory control’ models.  In addition, empirical work by Roll (1984) and Stoll (1989) has 
identified order processing costs as a component of the spread not dealt with by the two main 
strands of the theoretical literature.  We deal with each of these aspects of the spread in turn. 
 
In the ‘asymmetric information’ models, dealers trade with liquidity traders and with informed 
traders.  The latter group has information which is superior to that of the dealers, so bid and ask 
prices are set in order to compensate dealers for the perceived adverse selection risk.  Kyle 
(1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) suggest that if market 
conditions are such that market makers3 become concerned that there is a higher proportion of 
informed traders in the market, or that the informed traders have better information, they will widen 
the bid-ask spread to compensate themselves for the additional adverse selection risk.  Therefore 
the “bid-ask spread can be a purely informational phenomenon, occurring even when all the 
specialist’s fixed and variable transactions costs (including his time, inventory costs, etc.) are zero”  
(Glosten and Milgrom (1985) p. 72.). 
 
In addition, Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1992) both predict that trading volumes will rise 
when there is information asymmetry.  This suggests a positive relationship between spreads and 
unusually high trading volumes, since dealers interpret an unusually high volume as a sign of an 
increased number of informed traders and widen their quoted spreads accordingly. 
 
These asymmetric information theories of the bid-ask spread have been developed either with 
monopoly market makers in mind, or for identical competing market makers who quote the same 
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prices in equilibrium. In practice Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) report that market makers 
on the London Stock Exchange typically maintain a constant and identical bid-ask spread, though 
the quoted prices may be different.4 They find that the average quoted spread in their sample of 
liquid equities is 1.61 percent, which is generally wider than the inside spread which has an average 
value of 1.04 percent. Hence any single market maker is normally only ever on one side of the 
touch, and therefore only attracting order flow in one direction. A market maker`s quotes will either 
be on the bid side of the touch, or the ask side of the touch, or will be straddling the touch. In the 
face of adverse selection concerns rather than widen their spreads, individual market makers can 
adjust the levels of their bid and ask quotes to take their quotes away from the touch. This will have 
the effect of widening the inside spread, so that although the individual quoted spreads of market 
makers remains constant, the touch will widen in the face of adverse selection.  
 
The relationships between spreads and trading volumes should be particularly evident around 
earnings announcements, as the time just before an announcement presents an opportunity for 
information to be asymmetrically distributed: corporate insiders, accountants, and lawyers 
potentially have more information about company fundamentals than outside investors, including 
market makers.  The prediction of the adverse selection models is that inside spreads should widen 
before an earnings announcement, as there is increased probability that trades are initiated by 
investors with superior information and individual market makers move their quotes away from the 
touch;  while inside spreads should fall after an announcement, once the information has become 
public, and market makers again start to offer more competitive quotes.  It is possible within the 
context of these models that inside spreads would not fall immediately after the announcement, as 
there is still some advantage to be gained by market agents who did not have superior information 
before the announcement, but have superior information-processing abilities5.  In fact, Kim and 
Verrecchia (henceforward KV) (1994) argue that the disclosure of the earnings actually causes 
increased information asymmetry risk, so that spreads should widen after the announcement rather 
than before it.  In either case one would expect inside spreads to return to normal levels within a 
few days of the announcement. 
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KV (1991a, 1991b) also argue that heterogeneous beliefs around earnings announcements induce 
market participants to trade.  Therefore increased information asymmetry at announcement dates 
should result in higher trading volumes as well as increased spreads, in line with the predictions of 
Kyle (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1992). 
 
‘Inventory control’ models of the spread are based on the premise that risk averse market makers 
have a desired inventory position.  Maintaining this inventory position implies taking on the risk of 
unfavourable stock price movements, and market makers charge investors the spread to 
compensate them for this risk.  There are two aspects to inventory risk:  the risk of being unable to 
trade the stock and the risk that prices will change while stocks are being held. 
 
The first of these risks will be higher, the more difficult it is for the market maker to return to his 
desired inventory level (Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1980, 1983)).  A dealer 
who has recently purchased a large quantity of stock and therefore has imbalanced inventories, may 
temporarily reduce both his bid and his ask quotes. He will reduce his bid quote to ensure that he is 
not quoting the best bid, and will not therefore purchase any additional stock. In addition he may 
reduce his ask to attempt to obtain the most competitive ask quote in order to induce potential 
purchasers to trade with him, and reduce his costly inventories.  According to Ho and Stoll (1983) 
the reservation fee of a market maker for buying or selling stock, will determine his posted quotes, 
and will depend on the variance of the stock return, the market maker’s degree of risk aversion, 
and the market maker’s inventory level. Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) test this hypothesis 
and find that: market makers with the most divergent inventories are most likely to execute large 
trades; a larger fraction of the order flow is executed by market makers posting the best quotes; 
and quote changes are related to changes in relative inventory positions. They point out that at 
times, there may be a large disparity in the inventories of different dealers as a result of which the 
shortest dealer is aggressively at the bid, and the longest dealer aggressively at the ask. At this time 
the inside spread can be close to zero. 
 
In a liquid market characterised by high trading volumes6, dealers need only set a narrow ‘inventory 
spread’, since dealers are assured of being able to quickly restore out-of-equilibrium positions.  The 
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inventory control theories therefore predict that as the liquidity of a stock increases, the 
compensation required by the market maker through the spread is reduced, resulting in a negative 
relationship between trading volumes and quoted spreads. Translating this prediction to inside 
spreads, we can see that if all market makers are quoting narrow spreads in liquid stocks, we 
would expect the inside spread to also be inversely related to trading volumes 
 
The second feature of inventory risk is related to the underlying variability of the stock return. 
Garber and Silber (1979), and Ho and Stoll (1981) demonstrate that the more volatile is the stock 
price, the more the market maker is exposed to the risk of unfavourable price movements. 
Consequently the wider is the bid-ask spread necessary to compensate the market maker, leading 
to a positive correlation between return variability and the spread. Again if all market makers quote 
wide spreads in high variability stocks, but again only quote at the touch on one side of the market, 
then the inside spread will be positively related to return variability. Around earnings 
announcements, an increase in uncertainty concerning the reported earnings as the earnings 
announcement date approaches, would suggest that spreads would increase. Though this would be 
offset by any increase in trading volumes, making the market more liquid. 
 
Finally, as with inventory risk, the existence of order processing costs will imply a negative 
relationship between trading volumes and quoted spreads.  If dealers must recover fixed transaction 
costs through the bid-ask spread, then the larger the number of transactions, the lower the cost per 
transaction, and again the lower will be the inside spread. 
 
 
II(2)  Evidence on Spreads Around Earnings Announcements 
Using daily data on closing bid and ask prices Morse and Ushman (1983) were unable to uncover 
any evidence that bid-ask spreads change around earnings announcements.  It has been suggested 
that this finding could be due to the information and volume effects working in opposite directions, 
since the former causes spreads to widen, but the increased trading volumes around the 
announcement dates result in a fall in spreads.  Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), also using daily data, 
 11
found that spreads widened after earnings announcements only when there was no other type of 
information released prior to the announcement date.   
 
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) used intraday data on bid and ask prices, and found that spreads 
increased during the half-hour containing the earnings announcement, and remained wider for the 
rest of that day.  This increase in spreads continues for at least one trading day after the 
announcement.  They also reported a reduction in the quoted depth (the number of shares available 
at each bid and ask price) prior to the time of the announcement.  Yohn (1998) also finds that 
spreads increase in the four days prior to an earnings announcement, on the announcement day, and 
on the day after the announcement.  He found that spreads revert to their normal levels within ten 
days of the announcement.   
 
Brooks (1996) looked at the change in the level of information asymmetry around earnings and 
dividend announcements, using a regression-based measure of asymmetric information due to 
Hasbrouck (1991).  He also examined changes in the bid-ask spread.  He found a negative 
relationship between his measure of asymmetry and the bid-ask spread;  also, his results indicated 
little significant effect of announcements on either of the variables, although there was weak 
evidence of a reduction in asymmetry before and after earnings announcements.  Using methods 
suggested by Roll (1984), Stoll (1989), George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) for estimating the 
components of the spread, Krinsky and Lee (1996) have analysed the components of the bid-ask 
spread around earnings announcements. They find that the adverse selection component (or 
information spread) increases markedly in the period around the announcement, but that the 
inventory and order processing components decline, so that overall the spread remains fairly 
constant 
 
 
III  Data 
The dataset which forms the basis for our empirical tests consists of a sample of 195 less-liquid 
stocks on the London Stock Exchange.  These stocks were all constituents of the FT-All Share 
Index, and were in deciles two to four in terms of market capitalisation of those constituents.  Most 
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of the companies in our sample were also constituents of the FT250 Midi Index.  The reason for 
focusing on this sample of less-liquid stocks is that spreads are much wider than for the more liquid 
FTSE100 stocks, and therefore any movement in spreads should be easier to identify. We 
collected earnings announcement data over the period 1986-94 from Extel's Sequencer package, 
and from Extel cards in the earlier part of the sample, This resulted in eight final earnings 
announcements per company, (1,505 final earnings announcements).  The cards and news service 
record the date of each announcement.  The timing of the announcement of the earnings figure is at 
the discretion of the Stock Exchange, and although the Exchange records the release time of the 
most recent earnings announcement for a company, it proved impossible to obtain the exact time of 
past earnings announcements. 
 
Trading volume data were obtained from Datastream.  We extracted turnover by volume from 
Datastream datatype VO, which shows the number of shares traded per day.  In addition we also 
tested our results with a different definition of trading volume, Datastream datatype AN, which is 
the aggregate number of shares transacted for non-stock exchange members.  These two series are 
highly correlated and the results did not alter with either definition.  We therefore only report results 
based on the VO definition of trading volume.  . 
 
Daily closing bid and ask prices were obtained from Datastream for all trading days between 27th 
October 1986 to 1st February 1994. All weekends and public holidays were excluded from the 
sample, so that the maximum number of trading days’ data for any single company was 2,091.  
These closing prices are the best bid and ask prices quoted by market makers at the close of the 
market each day.  They are not ‘stale’ transactions prices, since quotes are updated even if no 
transactions take place on that day, so there should be no concern about thin trading.  Datastream 
does not publish information on ask prices before 1986, and this therefore determined the starting 
date for the sample.7 
 
It is worth discussing whether using the Datastream daily closing prices is valid, when Lee et al 
(1993) use intraday data.  One argument that may be raised is that closing ‘best’ prices are not 
indicative of ‘average’ market-maker behaviour during the day.  The other possible problem is that 
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closing prices are, in general, not representative of intraday prices.  We address each of these 
issues below, first outlining the procedure for setting bid and ask prices on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). 
 
Over the period 1986-97 the LSE operated as a dealer market with competing market makers, 
each market maker continuously quoting a bid price at which he was willing to buy securities, and 
an ask price at he was willing to sell.  Although its trading mechanism changed in 1997 to an order-
driven system for the most liquid FTSE100 stocks, over the time period 1986-94 which we 
examine, and for the FTSE250 stocks in our sample, the relevant trading mechanism remains the 
quote-driven system.  Trading in shares at the LSE takes place by telephone through a small 
number of registered market makers.  Market makers announce on SEAQ screens firm prices at 
which they are willing to buy and sell given quantities of stock up to a preset maximum.  The lowest 
ask price and highest bid price, which represents the best prices from the point of view of the 
customer, are highlighted on the SEAQ screens and are called the ‘yellow strip’ prices or the 
‘touch’. 
 
The quoted bid and ask prices of competing market makers might differ, and the closing prices on 
Datastream are the bid and ask prices at the touch (also called the inside spread), representing the 
best prices - the narrowest spread - available.  A rule of the Exchange is that brokers are obliged to 
trade on behalf of their clients at the best prices, so that outside investors should trade at no worse 
than the touch, though they may trade at even better prices. Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1999) 
report that 33 per cent of London Stock Exchange trades occur at prices better than the inside 
spread: the effective spread is narrower than the inside spread due to preferencing.  We have 
already noted that market makers set constant spreads and typically only quote competitive prices 
on one side of the spread.  
 
Turning to the question of whether closing prices are representative of intraday prices, Abhyankar, 
Ghosh, Levin and Limack (1997) examine intraday ‘inside’ spreads (spreads at the touch) on the 
LSE and find that average spreads vary only slightly during the mandatory quote period.  This 
suggests that the average spread over the day should be an unbiased predictor of the closing 
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spread.  In fact, we were able to test directly for bias, since we had access to some intraday data 
provided by the LSE, relating to a small sub-sample of seven of the companies in our sample8.  The 
intraday dataset consists of a continuous record of all transactions and the best ask and bid quotes 
in these seven stocks between 1st April 1992 and 11th March 1994, which represents 492 trading 
days.  We were therefore able to use this data to test the hypothesis that intraday spreads are an 
unbiased estimator of closing spreads. 
 
Finally, as noted above, the study by Lee et al  (1993) makes use of intraday stock price data, and 
provides evidence on the movement in spreads at half-hourly intervals. Although the volatility of 
intraday data, forces them to average the half-hourly stock price reaction for the days before and 
after the earnings announcement, to obtain a clear picture of the effect of the earnings announcement 
on spreads.  Although using closing prices clearly restricts the examination of the immediate effect of 
the earnings announcement on spreads, an advantage of this data is that we were able to investigate 
the daily movement in spreads over every trading day in 1986-94 (see footnote).  This period 
includes 1,505 final earnings announcements for the 195 companies, about eight announcements per 
company.  Hence we are able to control for any time effects in the movements in spreads around 
earnings announcements, which would not be possible in a short window of perhaps one year’s 
worth of intraday data. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of daily closing spreads, daily trading volumes and daily return 
variability.   
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel A shows that the average inside spread across all observations is 2.3%.  The median is 
1.84%, indicating some right skewness in the distribution.  These are higher than the spreads 
reported in Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998), because our inside spreads relate to less liquid 
stocks. The spread is bounded from below by zero and the upper 10% of the observations are 
above 4.2%.  Panel B shows that the overall standard deviation is 0.0175%.  The ‘within’ 
component, which reflects the contribution of variation over time to the overall standard deviation, is 
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of the same order of magnitude as the ‘between’ component, which reflects the contribution of 
cross-sectional variation.9 
 
Mean daily trading volume is 603,300, considerably higher than the median of 153,600.  In 
addition, the overall standard deviation is extremely high and the distribution ranges from 6,000 at 
the lower end to 1.5 million at the upper end.  The ‘between’ component of the standard deviation 
is less than half the ‘within’ component, implying that the time series variation is much greater than 
the cross-sectional variation.  To avoid the distortion caused by large outliers we transformed the 
trading volume variable by taking natural logarithms. 
 
The average value of the squared daily return, which proxies return variability, is 3.774 %2. More 
than 25% of the observations are zero, reflecting the fact that on a large number of days no price 
change has occurred.  From Panel B it can be seen that, as with the trading volumes, the ‘within’ 
component of the standard deviation is more than ten times greater than the ‘between’ component, 
implying that the time series variation is much greater than the cross-sectional variation. 
 
In Panel C we report the mean values of daily spreads and volumes during the event window (see 
below for a discussion on the choice of window).  It can be seen that spreads start to fall below 
their normal level 15 days before the announcement date.  On the announcement date spreads 
narrow to 2.16% on average.  They stay down for a further two days, begin to rise and only begin 
to approach the long-run norm in the (+16, +90) period.  Trading volumes increase dramatically on 
the day of the announcement and stay high on the following two days. 
 
These descriptive statistics are indicative of the relationship among spreads, trading volumes, return 
variability and earnings announcements.  However, they do not take account of the interactions 
between these variables, which are examined in the models described in the following section. 
 
IV  Methodology 
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In a preliminary investigation of the data we examined the movement in spreads over the reporting 
year.  We estimated equation (1), which assigns dummies to each five-day period over the year, 
except for the announcement day, day 0. 
 
s A B Dj t
T
j j t, , ,? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?  
(? ? {(-125, -121), (-120, -116), ... (-5, -1), (1, 5), (6, 10), . . ., (121, 125)}) (1) 
 
where sj,t is the bid-ask spread of company j at the close of trading on day t and is defined as the 
difference between the ask and the bid prices as a percentage of the mid-point price:  
sj,t = 2*(ASKj,t - BIDj,t)/(ASKj,t +BIDj,t); 
Dj,? is a set of dummies, which take the value 1 for each 5-day trading period, ?, around each 
earnings announcement; and 0 elsewhere;  and  ? j,t is an error term 
 
There are typically 250 trading days in an accounting year, and the classification of this set of 
dummies ensures that every 5-day period in the 125 trading days either side of the announcement is 
included in the regression.  The periods ? ?  {(-125, -121), (-120, -116), ... (-5, -1), (1, 5), (6, 
10), ..., (121, 125)} encapsulate the usual interval between each final earnings announcement, as 
shown in Figure 1, where we present the frequency distribution of the time interval between each 
company’s successive earnings announcements.  For each announcement this time interval is equally 
divided between a ‘pre-announcement’ period (denoted by a minus sign) and a ‘post-
announcement’ period (denoted by a plus sign), centred around the day of the earnings 
announcement (day 0). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
All days outside the period (-125, +125) were dropped from the estimation, so the intercept 
coefficient, A, is the estimated spread on the announcement day.  In Figure 2 we present the 
estimation results.  The intercept is just above 2.3%, confirming the descriptive statistics in Panel A 
of table 1.  It can be also seen that spreads appear to decline from about 90 days before the 
announcement, fall sharply on the day of the announcement, and stay down until about 90 days after 
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it.10,11  This is surprising in view of the results of Lee et al (1993) and Yohn (1998), but more 
comprehensive tests resulted in the same pattern. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We used this preliminary investigation of the spreads pattern over the year to determine the length 
of the event period, choosing an event window running between day -90 and day +90.  Within this 
period we identified sub-intervals to reflect the patterns suggested by Figure 2.  These sub-intervals 
were as follows:  (-90, -16), (-15, -3), -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, (+3, +15), (+16, +90). 
 
We then estimated two sets of regression equations to investigate the behaviour of spreads, trading 
volumes and return variability around earnings announcements.  The first set (equations (2a), (2b) 
and (2c)) represents simple univariate tests designed to confirm the pattern suggested by the 
descriptive statistics, namely that spreads, volumes and return variability do indeed change during 
the chosen event window.  This is done by assigning dummy variables to the sub-intervals within the 
event period, and regressing the spread, volume or return variability on these dummies: 
 
s a b Dj t
T
j j t, , ,? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?   (2a) 
Vol a b Dj t
T
j j t,
/ /
, ,
/? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?   (2b) 
Var a b Dj t
T
j j t,
/ / / /
, ,
//? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?   (2c) 
 
where sj,t is the inside spread, as defined above; 
Volj,t is the log of the total number of shares traded (buys and sells) in company j’s shares during 
day t;  
VARj,t is the square of stock j’s return on day t, a proxy for return variability12;  and 
Dj,T are dummy variables which now take on the value 1 if period T lies in the event window, and 0 
otherwise;  T ?  {(-90, -16), (-15, -3), -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, (+3, +15), (+16, +90)}.  
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The theoretical literature discussed in section II typically predicts a widening of the spread before 
the announcement date, with a reversion to normal levels soon afterwards.  Conversely, the KV 
model predicts a widening of the spread and increase in volumes after the announcement.  In 
addition the inventory control model of Ho and Stoll (1983) with competing dealers suggests that 
spreads might narrow before an earnings announcement as dealers ensure a neutral inventory 
position by the event date. Therefore positive coefficients on the 
T
b - in equation (2a) (where 
T - indicates dates before the announcement) would support the conventional models of the spread.  
In addition the coefficients on some or all of the bT+ and b0 (since prices are measured at the close 
of trading) should not be significantly different from zero, depending on how long it takes the market 
to adjust to the new information.  The KV model will be supported if b0, and some or all of the bT+ 
are significantly positive.  The same arguments apply to the ?b coefficients in equation (2b). 
 
Turning to equation (2c), the general finding in the literature is that volatility increases immediately 
after an announcement (see Beaver (1968) and Kalay and Loewenstein (KL) (1985) for early 
examples and Acker (1999) for a more recent one) and remains high for one or two days.  Some 
papers have also found that volatility is lower than usual in the period leading up to an 
announcement although not immediately before it (Beaver (1968) and KL (1985) again;  and two 
studies using implied volatilities, Donders and Vorst (1996) and Acker (2001) also obtain this 
result).  We would therefore certainly expect b0//, b1// and possibly b2//  to be significantly positive;  
and some or all of the bT-//  may also be negative. 
 
The second set of equations explicitly models the interactions between trading volumes, return 
variability and spreads.  We use a series of nested models to identify the extent to which the spread 
can be explained by order processing costs (trading volumes), inventory control costs (trading 
volumes and return variability) and asymmetric information (excess volume).  The models, shown in 
order of increasing complexity, are as follows: 
 
Model 1: sj,t = ?  + ? Volj,t + ?j,t 
Model 2: sj,t = ?  + ? Volj,t + ? XVolj,t + ?  VARj,t + ?  MVARt  + ? j,t 
Model 3:  s Vol XVol VAR MVAR Dj t j t j t j t t
T
j j t, , , , , ,? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ??
?
?  
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where XVolj,t is the excess trading volume, defined as the percentage difference between firm j’s 
actual trading volume and its average trading volume over time, when this difference is positive;  
and zero otherwise;13  
MVARt is the unweighted mean of VARj,t across all stocks on day t, which is a proxy for market 
variability;  and  
?j,t, ? j,t , ? j,t are error terms, with the other variables as defined above 
 
Model 1 investigates the relationship between spreads and trading volumes, to identify the extent to 
which movements in the spread are related to observable inventory control and transactions costs 
considerations.  As discussed above, the order processing costs and/or inventory control should 
result in a negative relationship between the daily level of trading volume and the size of the spread 
(?  < 0). 
 
Model 2 includes excess volumes and return variability measures as additional control variables.  
Excess volume is used as a proxy for information asymmetry, as suggested by the Kyle (1985), 
Easley and O’Hara (1992) and KV (1991a 199b) models.  A positive relationship between the 
excess trading volumes and spreads (? > 0) confirms the joint hypothesis that both spreads and 
excess volumes reflect observable information asymmetry.  The coefficients on the return variability 
terms, ?  and ?  should be positive, reflecting the fact that spreads will increase with inventory risk. 
 
Having established the relationship between closing spreads, daily trading volumes and return 
variability, we then investigate in more detail the change in spreads around earnings announcements.  
Model 3 includes the sub-interval event period dummy variables (the ‘T dummies’).  The model 
examines whether there is any change in the spread in the event period which is not accounted for 
by normal and excess trading volumes, or by return variability.  Significant coefficients on the 
dummies would suggest that the bid-ask spread during the event window reflects changes in 
information asymmetry or costs, which are not entirely captured by the explanatory variables in 
Model 2. 
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We might anticipate that the distributions of the error terms in Models 1 to 3 (?j,t, ? j,t, ? j,t) will vary 
over the j companies. One solution to this problem is to correct the estimated standard errors from 
the pooled regressions for heteroscedasticity.  Our first set of results (table 3 below) therefore uses 
White’s heteroscedastic-consistent covariance estimator.  A second approach exploits the fact that 
we have panel data on a cross-section of firms over time, and models the error terms appropriately.  
The residuals in models 1 to 3 (and also in equations (2a) to (2c)) can be separated into two 
components, ? j + ? jt, say, where ? j is a firm-specific residual, and ? jt has all the usual properties 
(zero mean, homoscedastic, uncorrelated with itself and with ? j).  Assuming that the ? j are fixed 
and estimable we may estimate the models as fixed effects panel models, in which case the ? j may 
be interpreted as dummy variables for each firm, taking on the value of unity for firm j, and zero 
elsewhere.  We therefore re-estimated all models as fixed effects panel models, with results 
presented in table 4 below.  The results are discussed in the following section. 
 
Finally, we re-estimated the models including dummy variables for calendar years, since the size of 
the spread in bull and in bear markets is likely to vary considerably. 
 
V  Results 
In table 2 we present the results of estimating equations (2a) to (2c).  The results of the pooled 
estimations are reported in the first two columns and those of the fixed effects estimations are in the 
third and fourth columns.  The high values of the F statistics in these last two columns verify the joint 
significance of the fixed effects terms. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The equation (2a) results show that spreads do drop significantly by the end of the announcement 
day, as predicted by the standard microstructure models, and in contrast to the KV predictions.  
The size of the drop is of the order of 0.16 to 0.2 percentage points, which reduces the spread to 
below normal levels, whereas the standard models predict that spreads return to normal 
immediately after the announcement.  Although the drop reaches its maximum by the end of the 
announcement day, the reduction in spreads appears to start some 15 days before the 
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announcement day.  There is evidence from the fixed effects regression that spreads in the period (-
90, -16) increase very slightly, although this is not apparent in the pooled model.  After the 
announcement both models indicate that spreads begin to rise again, although they stay below their 
‘normal’ level of 2.3% for the next 90 days.14 
 
The equation (2b) regressions are concerned with trading volumes.  As expected, volumes reach a 
maximum on day 0.  The volume increase begins on day -1 and continues for 15 days after the 
announcement, although, as with the spreads, the maximum increase is on the announcement day.  
The implications of the regressions for the (-90, -2) and (+16, +90) periods are ambiguous.  The 
pooled and fixed effects models generate different results, although the general pattern appears to 
be that there are higher volumes than normal during these periods. 
 
The equation (2c) results show that, as expected, there is a substantial increase in volatility on the 
day of the earnings announcement, which continues into the following day, although at a reduced 
level.  Interestingly, in line with the papers mentioned above, we also find a dip in volatility in the 
ninety day period leading up to the announcement, although not immediately before it.  There is also 
a dip in the ninety day period after the announcement, and this result is consistent with the findings in 
Acker (2001). 
 
In summary, it is clear that volumes, spreads and return variability are affected by the 
announcement, with generally lower spreads and higher volumes in the period surrounding the 
announcement;  and high variability on the announcement day and the day after. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the pooled and panel regressions respectively, fitting models 1 
to 3, together with the expanded model 3 which includes the calendar year dummies.  Model 1 
shows that, as expected, the relationship between the spread and trading volume is significantly 
negative, reflecting the reduction in the fixed costs as the number of trades increases.  The effect is 
less pronounced in the panel regressions, suggesting that including firm-specific dummies soaks up 
much of the volume effect:  market-makers may well keep to historically-determined spreads 
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according to the company being traded, the spread being highly correlated with the historical trading 
volumes in that company. 
 
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Model 2 includes trading volumes, excess volumes, and firm and market return variability as 
explanatory variables.  The previous results are robust to amending the model specification, again 
showing a highly significant negative relationship between spreads and normal trading volumes.  As 
predicted, spreads are positively related to excess volumes, and to firm and market return 
variability.  Again the pooled and the panel results are very similar. 
 
Model 3 examines the effects of an announcement on the spread, while controlling for the effects of 
changes in volumes, excess volumes and variability at this time.  The results in tables 3 and 4 for 
model 3 show that the ‘normal’ relationships established between spreads, volumes, excess 
volumes and variability in model 2 are robust to the inclusion of the T dummy variables.   
 
The fixed effects regressions reveal that the T dummies are all negative and most are significant at 
conventional levels.  In the pooled regression, these dummies are also negative, although not all are 
significant at conventional levels.  Clearly the addition of the fixed effects terms refines the 
specification of model 3.  Both the fixed effects and the pooled regressions have a significantly 
negative coefficient on the day 0 dummy.  This demonstrates that spreads narrow significantly by 
the end of the announcement day, even after having accounted for the effects of higher trading 
volumes and additional return variability. 
 
These results suggest that, having controlled for the effects of changes in the various independent 
variables, spreads fall significantly on the announcement day.  In fact, they narrow from 15 days 
before the announcement and continue to fall on and after the announcement day.  Surprisingly they 
do not revert to normal levels until more than 90 days after the announcement. 
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We argued in Section II that the period preceding the announcement is likely to be characterised by 
an unusual amount of asymmetric information, which should be eliminated once the announcement 
has been made.  Our results confirm that the degree of asymmetric information is reduced by the 
end of the announcement day, but the fact that spreads start to fall quite some time before the 
announcement is not explained by the theoretical models.  Neither is the sluggish recovery of 
spreads to their pre-announcement levels. 
 
Finally we return to the issue discussed in the data section, namely the validity of using closing daily 
spreads rather than intraday spreads.  Using the sub-sample of seven stocks for which we have 
intraday data, we test whether the mean daily spread is an unbiased predictor of the closing spread 
by estimating the following equation: 
 
sj,t = ? + ?  s j t,  + ? j,t (3) 
where 
sj,t is the closing inside spread for day t of company j, as defined above;  and 
s j t,  is the average inside spread over day t of company j.  This average is computed by 
observing the registered spread at the touch each time a transaction takes place during the 
day, and calculating the mean spread during that day. 
 
The null hypothesis of unbiasedness in spreads is that ? = 0 and ?  = 1.  The results are presented in 
table 5.  Column 1 of the table shows that, as predicted, the intercept coefficient is not significantly 
different from 0 and the slope coefficient is not significantly different from 1.  Column 2 shows the 
results of estimating an expanded model which includes the T dummies referred to earlier.  This 
second model allows for the possibility that the relationship between spreads throughout the day 
and closing spreads changes during the event window.  Again the intercept and slope coefficients 
are as expected, but the coefficient on the announcement day dummy is significantly positive.  This 
implies that on the day of an earnings announcement spreads are wider at the end of the day than 
they are, on average, during the day.  These results strengthen our earlier conclusions.  The 
narrowing of the spreads observed at the close of the announcement day and reported in tables 2 to 
4 must underestimate the general narrowing that occurs during the day. 
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VI  Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated the behaviour of inside spreads around earnings announcements.  
We find that spreads fall, and volumes and return variability rise on announcement days.  In 
addition, inside spreads are affected by normal and excess trading volumes and by return variability.  
These announcement day effects are consistent with both asymmetric information and inventory 
control models of the bid-ask spread. 
 
We have examined whether inside spreads change significantly around earnings announcements, on 
the basis that this is a time when one would expect unobservable information asymmetries to be 
most pronounced.  After allowing for the higher trading volumes and variability on the 
announcement day, spreads narrow by the end of the day of the earnings announcement.  These 
results were true in both our pooled regressions and in the fixed effects models.  The strong 
conclusion that we draw from our empirical work is that market makers quote narrower spreads 
once the earnings have been announced, both because of the reduced concerns about asymmetric 
information, and the lower inventory costs due to the high levels of trading volumes.  This result is in 
contrast to the findings of Lee et al (1993) and Yohn (1998) who report that for US data spreads 
rise before the earnings announcement and remain at a higher level even after the announcement has 
been made. 
 
A puzzling characteristic of our data set is the apparent extended effect of the announcement.  The 
narrowing of spreads and the increase of trading volumes begins at least fifteen days before the 
announcement date. Even more surprising is the sluggish recovery of both spreads and volumes.  
Spreads remain below normal levels for up to 90 days after the announcement;  similarly, volumes 
are abnormally high during this period. Recently, Hansch et el (1998) have emphasised the 
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announcement date approaches. After the earnings announcement, the documented higher trading 
volumes mean that inventory control costs are low, so that spreads remain narrow. We are not able 
to test this hypothesis directly without information on inventories of individual market makers, and 
we leave a test of such a hypothesis to future work. 
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Figure 1  Distribution of number of trading days between successive earnings 
announcements 1986 - 1994 
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The figure shows the frequency distribution of the time interval between each company’s successive earnings 
announcements.  For each announcement this time interval is equally divided between a ‘pre-announcement’ 
period (denoted by a minus sign) and a ‘post-announcement’ period (denoted by a plus sign), centred around 
the day of the earnings announcement (day 0). 
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Figure 2  Estimated inside spreads around announcement dates 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Distribution of inside spread, trading volume and return variability 
 
   Percentiles 
 Number of 
observations 
Mean 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Daily inside spread 402,729 0.0230 0.0086 0.0123 0.0184 0.0278 0.0420 
Daily trading volume 
(000) 
 
282,306 
 
603.3 
 
6.0 
 
29.9 
 
153.6 
 
578.8 
 
1,548.0 
Ln (volume) 282,074 4.7876 1.7917 3.4012 5.0370 6.3620 7.3454 
Daily variability of 
company returns (%2) 
 
402,244 
 
3.774 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.279 
 
1.793 
 
6.805 
 
 
Panel B:  Standard deviations of inside spread, trading volume and return variability 
 
 Overall standard 
deviation 
Between Within 
Daily inside spread 0.0175 0.0110 0.0137 
Daily trading volume 
(000) 
 
1,773,331 
 
744,640 
 
1,604,475 
Ln (volume) 2.1182 1.4625 1.5670 
Daily variability of 
company returns  (%2) 
 
24.406 
 
2.415 
 
24.289 
 
‘Between’ denotes the cross-sectional standard deviation of the time series means 
‘Within’ denotes the cross-sectional mean of the time series standard deviations 
 
 
Panel C:  Mean values of inside spreads and trading volumes around earnings announcement 
 
Days around 
announcement 
Daily spread Daily trading volume (000) Ln(volume) 
(-90,-16) 0.0235 593.98 4.779 
(-15,-3) 0.0225 533.65 4.739 
-2 0.0222 609.63 4.875 
-1 0.0223 595.74 4.967 
0 0.0216 1,843.98 6.250 
+1 0.0215 1,196.94 5.908 
+2 0.0216 780.42 5.371 
(+3,+15) 0.0219 644.17 4.974 
(+16,+90) 0.0221 588.75 4.757 
 
Inside spreads and trading volumes were averaged across companies for the following sub-intervals around 
the earnings announcements: ( -90, -16), (-15, -3), -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, (+3, +15), (+16, +90). 
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Table 2  Estimates of equations (2a) to (2c) 
 Pooled Fixed Effects 
 Equation (2a) 
(dependent 
variable:  
spreads) 
Equation (2b) 
(dependent 
variable:  log 
volumes) 
Equation (2c) 
(dependent 
variable:  daily 
return  
variability %2) 
Equation (2a) 
(dependent 
variable:  
spreads) 
Equation (2b) 
(dependent 
variable:  log 
volumes) 
Equation (2c) 
(dependent 
variable:  daily 
return  
variability  %2) 
Constant 0.0236 4.7600 4.192 0.0233 4.7250 4.139 
(498.537)** (691.386)** (60.249)** (621.255)** (922.552)** (62.355)** 
DUM(-90, -16) -0.0001 0.0201 -0.539 0.0003 0.0673 -0.045 
(-1.760) (1.937)* (-5.138)** (5.192)** (8.734)** (-4.528)** 
DUM(-15, -3) -0.0011 -0.0200 -1.063 -0.0006 0.0242 -0.989 
(-7.967)** (-1.034) (-7.492)** (-6.100)** (1.689) (-5.285)** 
DUM-2 -0.0014 0.1156 1.205 -0.0009 0.1707 1.281 
 (-2.981)* (1.775) (0.680) (-2.582)* (3.547)** (2.023)* 
DUM-1 -0.0013 0.2075 -0.230 -0.0008 0.2502 -0.155 
(-2.758)* (3.171)* (-0.621) (-2.279)* (5.177)** (-0.244) 
DUM0 -0.0020 1.4902 22.166 -0.0016 1.5810 22.239 
(-4.359)** (23.126)** (11.538)** (-4.358)** (33.219)** (35.057)** 
DUM+1 -0.0021 1.1479 4.029 -0.0017 1.2375 4.098 
(-4.616)** (17.807)** ( 4.658)** (-4.666)** (25.990)** (6.482)** 
DUM+2 -0.0019 0.6111 -0.103 -0.0015 0.7015 -0.000 
 (-4.269)** (9.475)** (-0.217) (-4.275)** (14.726)** (-0.058) 
DUM(+3, +15) -0.0017 0.2141 -0.835 -0.0013 0.2839 -0.766 
 (-12.871)** (11.155)** (-5.241)** (-12.295)** (19.987)** (-4.096)** 
DUM(+16, 
+90) 
-0.0015 -0.0024 -1.017 -0.0010 0.0514 -0.094 
 (-20.878)** (-0.232) (-11.025)** (-18.533)** (6.801)** (-9.487)** 
R squared 0.0016 0.0038 0.0036    
F(194, 402525)    1287.31**   
F(193, 281871)     1219.5**  
F(194, 402040)      20.04** 
No. in sample 402,729 282,074 402,244 402,729 282,074 402,244 
1. The table shows the regression results on equations (2a) to (2c): 
s a b Dj t
T
j j t, , ,? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?   (2a) 
Vol a b Dj t
T
j j t,
/ /
, ,
/? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?   (2b) 
Var a b Dj t
T
j j t,
/ / / /
, ,
/ /? ? ?
?
? ?
?
? ?   (2c) 
where sj,t is the inside spread of company j at the close of trading on day t and is defined as the difference 
between the ask and the bid prices as a percentage of the mid-point price; Volj,t is the log of the total number 
of shares traded  in company j’s shares during day t; VARj,t is the square of stock j’s return on day t, a proxy for 
return variability;  and Dj,T are dummy variables which take on the value 1 if period T lies in the event 
window, and 0 otherwise;  and T = {(-90, -16), (-15, -3), -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, (+3, +15), (+16, +90)}.  
2.  t-statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 5%;  ** = significant at 1%. 
3.  F(., n) is an F-test on the joint significance of the fixed effect terms, where . is the number of companies and 
n is degrees of freedom. (No R-squared is given in this table as it is not defined in a fixed effects model) 
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Table 3:  Models 1 to 3 (pooled) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 with year dummies 
Constant 0.0317 0.0313 0.0317 0.0275 
 (344.294)** (296.633)** (277.217)** (220.933)** 
Volj,t -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0018 
 (-102.030)** (-93.585)** (-93.852)** (-92.850)** 
XVolj,t  0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
  (9.478)** (9.451)** (9.589)** 
VAR j,t  0.8108 0.8119 0.8066 
  (9.240)** (9.196)** (9.303)** 
MVARt  3.0707 3.0343 1.0589 
  (23.452)** (23.175)** (8.629)** 
DUM(-90, -16)   0.0000 -0.0005 
  (0.381) (-5.376)** 
DUM(-15, -3)   -0.0008 -0.0011 
  (-4.573)** (-6.794)** 
DUM-2   -0.0009 -0.0012 
   (-1.546) (-2.085)* 
DUM-1   -0.0004 -0.0008 
  (-0.845) (-1.621) 
DUM0   -0.0017 -0.0020 
  (-3.227)** (-3.911)** 
DUM+1   -0.0004 -0.0008 
  (-0.820) (-1.657) 
DUM+2   -0.0006 -0.0009 
   (-1.143) (-1.952) 
DUM(+3, +15)   -0.0009 -0.0013 
   (-6.174)** (-8.744)** 
DUM(+16, +90)   -0.0011 -0.0014 
   (-13.401)** (-17.217)** 
DUM90    0.0060 
    (60.204)** 
DUM91    0.0070 
    (64.126)** 
DUM92    0.0102 
    (82.505)** 
DUM93    0.0048 
    (48.746)** 
DUM94    0.0016 
    (18.205)** 
DUM95    0.0025 
    (9.940)** 
R squared 0.0372 0.0609 0.0618 0.0935 
No. in sample 281,553 281,529 281,529 281,529 
1.  The table shows the regression results on  
Model 1 sj,t = ?  + ?Volj,t                  + ?j,t 
Model 2 sj,t = ?  + ?Volj,t + ? XVolj,t + ? VARj,t + ? MVARt   + ?j,t 
Model 3 s Vol XVol VAR MVAR Dj t j t j t j t t
T
j j t, , , , , ,? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ??
?
?  
where XVolj,t is excess trading volume;  VARj,t is the square of stock j’s return on day t, and MVARt is the 
unweighted mean of VARj,t across all stocks on day t. 
 
2.  t-statistics in parentheses (based on White’s heteroscedastic-consistent covariance estimator); 
 * = significant at 5%;  ** = significant at 1% 
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Table 4  Models 1 to 3 (fixed effects) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 with year dummies 
Constant 0.0261 0.0256 0.0259 0.0213 
 (321.081)** (299.639)** (281.371)** (201.772)** 
Volj,t -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 
 (-30.536)** (-39.380)** (-38.625)** (-33.560)** 
XVolj,t  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (8.205)** (8.202)** (8.388)** 
VAR j,t  0.4612 0.4633 0.4554 
  (44.201)** (44.344)** (45.117)** 
MVARt  3.2586 3.2200 1.1314 
  (55.197)** (54.556)** (19.089)** 
DUM(-90, -16)   0.0003 -0.0003 
  (3.969)** (-4..098)** 
DUM(-15 ,-3)   -0.0005 -0.0009 
  (-4.354)** (-7.522)** 
DUM-2   -0.0008 -0.0011 
   (-1.877) (-2.687)** 
DUM-1   -0.0005 -0.0009 
  (-1.200) (-2.266)* 
DUM0   -0.0020 -0.0025 
  (-4.993)** (-6.247)** 
DUM+1   -0.0013 -0.0017 
  (-3.136)** (-4.436)** 
DUM+2   -0.0011 -0.0016 
   (-2.797)** (-3.977)** 
DUM(+3, +15)   -0.0010 -0.0014 
   (-8.683)** (-12.228)** 
DUM(+16,+90)   -0.0010 -0.0013 
   (-15.025)** (-20.491)** 
DUM90    0.0065 
    (76.077)** 
DUM91    0.0074 
    (88.834)** 
DUM92    0.0107 
    (122.659)** 
DUM93    0.0045 
    (53.682)** 
DUM94    0.0016 
    (19.123)** 
DUM95    0.0029 
    (13.492)** 
F(193, 281358) 1,124.23    
F(193, 281331)  1,115.16   
F(193, 281322)   1,117.03  
F(193, 281316)    1,207.77 
No. of firms  194 194 194 194 
No. of obs. in sample 281,553 281,529 281,529 281,529 
 
Notes:  As table 3 (No R-squared is given in this table as i t is not defined in a fixed effects model) 
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Table 5  Relationship between closing daily inside spreads and mean intraday inside 
spreads 
 
 
 Equation (7) Equation (7) with ? dummies 
Constant -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (-0.070) (-0.018) 
s j t,  0.9984 0.9981 
 (0.176)?  (0.202)?  
DUM(-90,-16)  -0.0000 
  (-0.381) 
DUM(-15,-3)  -0.0001 
  (-0.592) 
DUM-2  -0.0008 
  (-1.198) 
DUM-1  0.0004 
  (0.645) 
DUM0  0.0015 
  (2.400)* 
DUM+1  -0.0006 
  (-0.381) 
DUM+2  -0.0006 
  (-0.334) 
DUM(+3,+15)  0.0002 
  (0.433) 
DUM(+16,+90)  0.0000 
  (0.891) 
R squared 0.7703 0.7710 
No. in sample 3,408 3,408 
 
Notes: 
1.  The table shows the results of estimating equation (7):  sj,t = ?  + ?  s j t,  +? j,t 
where 
sj,t is the closing inside spread for day t of company;  and 
s j t,  is the average inside spread over day t of company j. 
The null hypothesis of unbiasedness in spreads is that ?  = 0 and ?  = 1. 
 
2.  t-statistics in parentheses; * = significant at 5%;  ** = significant at 1%.;   
?  = not significantly different from 1. 
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1Inventory control risk also includes the risk that prices change while stocks are being held. 
2There is a vast literature on the degree of information conveyed by earnings announcements, based on the 
seminal papers of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) (see the review articles by Strong (1992) and Yadav 
(1992) for a summary).  Although it has been found that prices anticipate information appearing in earnings 
reports and that there is often at least some post-announcement drift, the general consensus is that earnings 
announcements do contain new information which is relevant to stock prices (Ball and Kothari (1994)). 
3We use the terms market makers and dealers interchangeably. 
4 Chan et al (1994) report that quoted spreads on NASDAQ are also constant 
5For example, recent work by Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2000) has identified that UK earnings 
announcements are followed by an immediate surge in trading activity by the directors of the announcing 
company.  Although directors do have superior information before the announcement, they are not able to make 
use of it, as they are prohibited from trading in the preceding two months. 
6 Kyle (1985) notes that the term market liquidity encompasses a number of transactional properties of markets, 
and we use trading volumes as a measure of liquidity. 
7We use daily closing prices since intra-day stock price data from the London Stock Exchange is not widely 
available prior to 1992, and our dataset on earnings announcements spans the years 1986-94.  
8We wish to thank John Board for providing this data, which was used in Board and Sutcliffe (1995). 
9Panel A in table 1 shows that there are considerably fewer observations on daily trading volumes than on daily 
spreads, because Datastream reports only sporadic trading volumes during 1987 and 1988. 
10For some stocks the bid and ask prices are no more than a few pence, so discreteness of prices means that 
percentage spreads are extremely sensitive to price movements on either side of the spread.  We re-estimated 
equation (1) excluding observations with a mid-price below £1 and the results were not affected. 
11 It appears that there is a peak in spreads round about the time when announcements of interim earnings are 
made.  However, we estimated equation (1) including a dummy variable to identify interim announcement 
periods, and it did not have a significant coefficient. 
12 We proxy stock return variability by the square of daily returns, as in Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) and Yohn 
(1998). 
13Logs of volume were not used for excess volume, as this would leave zero excess volume undefined. 
14Earlier regressions which were based on a longer post-announcement event period indicated that coefficients 
on post-90 day dummies were not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
